University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 27

Issue 2

Article 4

2016

The Battle of Disclosure Versus Privacy: Corporate Executives'
Personal, Private Facts
Thomas Lair

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Lair, Thomas (2016) "The Battle of Disclosure Versus Privacy: Corporate Executives' Personal, Private
Facts," University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 27: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol27/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

THE BATTLE OF DISCLOSURE VERSUS PRIVACY:
CORPORATE EXECUTIVES' PERSONAL, PRIVATE FACTS
Thomas Lair*

257

I.

INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................

II.

CLAIMED REASONS FOR A DUTY TO DISCLOSE UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS ................................................... 260
A. Lack of Guidance Under CurrentSecurities Laws ............... 260
B. Policy Behind DisclosingCorporateInformation................. 262

III.

THE DISCLOSURE DEBATE: WHAT PRIVATE
FACTS MUST BE DISCLOSED? ...........................

IV.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

NON-DISCLOSURE BASED ON EXECUTIVES' PRIVACY RIGHT ..... 266

A. The ConstitutionalPrivacyRight..........................................
B. The Company's ConfidentialBusiness Information..............
C. PublicDisclosure of PrivateFacts .......................................
D . Intrusion Upon Seclusion......................................................
E. Executives 'Health Information Privacy...............................
V.

267
268
269
275
278

280
C ON CLUSION .................................................
I. INTRODUCTION

Executive officers of public corporations ("executives") 1 are faced
with a decision to either disclose information about his or her private life
to the public ("private fact disclosures") or withhold such information
due to his or her privacy right. Regarding serious health issues, many
executives or their corporations have opted to disclose. In 2009, Steve
Jobs announced that he was taking medical leave of absence from Apple

LL.M. in Taxation Candidate, New York University School of Law; J.D./M.B.A. 2016,
University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S. 2013, University of Florida. I would like to
thank my family for their encouragement and support of this Note and all of my academic and
legal endeavors. Additionally, I would like to thank the editors and fellow members of the
University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy for their dedication and diligence
throughout the editing process.
1. Use of the term, "executive," in this Article refers to an officer or executive of a public
company.
*
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due to his cancer diagnosis. 2 More recently, in 2015, United Airlines
disclosed that its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Oscar Munoz, suffered
a heart attack.3
Executives' private fact disclosures are not limited to health matters.
For example, the Sun Valley magazine published an article that detailed
the divorce of Steve Wynn, CEO of Wynn Resorts, and his affair with a
woman "25 years his junior." 4 Additionally, the USA Today reported that
former Tyco CEO, Dennis Kozlowski, spent $6000 on a shower curtain.5
Investors might start considering these disclosures the norm. If an
executive fails to disclose a cancer diagnosis, but the media discovers the
diagnosis and publishes it, then investors may argue the executive
violated a disclosure duty by not publicizing the information earlier. To
support that argument, investors may claim that executives have a duty
to disclose certain private facts under securities laws 6 or antifraud
provisions. 7 Additionally, investors may argue that the policy behind the
8
securities laws justifies disclosure.
Investors' motives to obtain these disclosures may not be so innocent.
"[T]he public's thirst for more and detailed information about a broader
range of public personalities seems almost unquenchable." 9 In the wake
of corporate scandals, such as Enron's accounting scandal in 2001,10
General Motors' ignition switch scandal in 2014,11 or Volkswagen's
emission scandal in 2015,12 investors may use executives' private fact
2. Dan Childs & Kevin Dolak, Steve Jobs' PancreaticCancer: A Timeline, ABC NEWS
(Oct. 6, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/CancerPreventionAndTreatment/steve-jobs-pancr
eatic-cancer-timeline/story?id=14681812.
3. Everett Rosenfeld, United Continental CEO Oscar Munoz Hospitalized, CNBC (Oct.
16, 2015, 1:35 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/16/united-ceo-oscar-munoz-had-a-heart-attac
k-in-hospital-dj-citing-source.html.
4. Steve Friess, At Home with Elaine Wynn, SUN VALLEY MAG. (Fall 2012), http://www.
sunvalleymag.com/Sun-Valley-Home-and-Design/Fall-2012/At-Home-with-Elaine-Wynn/.
5. Exeter, Report: Tyco CEO Spent $6,000 for Shower Curtain, USA TODAY (Aug. 7,
2002), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/manufacturing/2002-08-07-tyco-ceo-m
oneyx.htm.
6. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(b), (f) (2015); 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2015).
7. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2015).
8. Alison B. Miller, Navigating the Disclosure Dilemma: Corporate Illegality and the
Federal Securities Laws, 102 GEO. L.J. 1647, 1652 (2014) (stating Congress enacted securities
laws to promote transparency in the market).
9. Patricia S. Abril & Ann M. Olazabal, The Celebrity CEO: CorporateDisclosureat the
Intersection of Privacyand Securities Law, 46 Hous. L. REv. 1545, 1551 (2010).
10. Enron, The Real Scandal, ECONOMIST (Jan. 17, 2002), http://www.economist.com/
node/940091.
11. Tom Hays & Tom Krisher, GM Will Pay $900 Million Over Ignition Switch Scandal,
YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 17, 2015, 11:10 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/gm-said-settle-criminal-caseover-ignition-switches-043342233--finance.html.
12. Karl Russell et al., How Volkswagen GotAway with DieselDeception,N.Y. TMEs (last
updated Mar. 24, 2016), hftp://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/intemational/vw-die
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disclosures as a means to obtain more corporate information.
Executives may desire to keep these private facts confidential for
many reasons. A Forbes article reported that stock prices tend to drop
immediately following a disclosure of bad news about a company
executive 1 Thus, one reason to not disclose may be to protect the
corporation's stock price. Additionally, an executive may seek to uphold
his or her privacy right. 14 Depending on the circumstances, an executive
may rely on a constitutional or statutory right to privacy.15 And if a
private individual unlawfully discloses the private fact, an executive may
utilize various tort-based claims to prevent further disclosure or seek
damages. 16
Yet, privacy rights are subject to limitations. It is unclear whether an
executives' privacy right will overcome the public's right to know the
information. An executive's public figure status may preclude a privacy
claim. 17 Scott McNealy, former CEO of Sun Microsystems, may not have
been too18far off when Scott said, "You already have zero privacy. Get
over it."

This Article illustrates the uncertainty executives face regarding
private fact disclosures. Greater clarity is needed to appropriately balance
executives' privacy right against the public's right to know investment
information. Under the current laws, this Article suggests that executives
should not disclose private facts that are not explicitly required by law
unless the private fact directly relates to the executive's ability or fitness
to hold the position, such as a terminal illness.19 Part II describes current
securities laws and discusses the potential arguments for a duty to
disclose.2 0 Part III explores the various types of private facts an executive
may disclose.21 Part IV discusses executives' privacy right and tort

sel-emissions-scandal-explained.html.
13. Davia Temin, Announcing CEO Illness -Best Practicesfrom Buffett to Jobs, FORBES
(Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/daviatemin/2012/04/18/announcing-ceo-illnessbest-practices-from-buffett-to-jobs/; see, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 3 (stating United's stock
price dropped after the disclosure).
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
16. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). See generally JON L.
MILLS, PRIVACY THE LOST RIGHT 17 (2008) (describing tort-based claims such as false light,

defamation, public disclosure of private facts, and intrusion upon seclusion).
17.

See generally Victoria Schwartz, Disclosing CorporateDisclosure Policies, 40 FLA.

ST. U. L. REv. 487, 495-96 (2013) (Persons who.., willingly become involved in public affairs
waive their right to privacy of matters connected with their public conduct.").
18. Edward C. Baig, Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Info. What's In It for You?,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 5, 1999), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1999-04-04/privacy.
19. See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 494-95.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part 111.
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22

H. CLAIMED REASONS FOR A DUTY TO DISCLOSE UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS

Under the current securities laws, there is no explicit duty for an
executive to publicly disclose his or her private information regarding
23
matters such as health concerns, family issues, or personal expenditures.
Yet, corporations, executives, and the media have been disclosing these
private matters to the public. 24 A corporation and its executives are
subject to a general duty to disclose material information, 25 and if either
violate that duty then a private individual, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), or the U.S. Justice Department may bring a securities
fraud action. 26 Additionally, both the SEC and Congress have indicated
that the public interest in corporate disclosures is to provide transparency
in the securities market.27 Should these private fact disclosures become
the norm, a foreseeable consequence of an executive's failure to disclose
is a spike in securities litigation.
A. Lack of Guidance Under Current Securities Laws
The SEC has promulgated a list of required disclosures that an
executive must include in the corporation's periodic or annual reports
filed with the SEC. 28 Executives must disclose their age,29 prior criminal
convictions, 30 pending legal proceedings, 31 and compensation. 32 None of
those explicitly required disclosures include the private facts at issue in
this Article.
The SEC requires that any public company disclose material
information to investors so that they can include it in their
calculation of whether to buy or sell a stock. But there are no
22.
23.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.A.

24.
25.
26.

See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
See generally Chiarella v. United States, 45 U.S. 222 (1980).
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q

(West 2011).
27. Miller, supra note 8, at 1652 (stating Congress enacted the 1933 Act and 1934 Act to
promote transparency in the market).
28. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2015); 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(b), (f) (2015); 17 C.F.R. §
229.402 (2015).
29. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(b).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
32. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402.
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and the SEC has never
specific guidelines governing health issues, 33
taken action against a company in this area.
Unless Congress or the SEC promulgates a new rule requiring
additional disclosures, investors must base a disclosure duty on an
alternative theory. Investors will likely rely on Rule 1Ob-5 34 or other
antifraud provisions to argue that the corporation, or its executive, had a
duty to disclose the private fact. 35 Rule lOb-5 provides that it is unlawful
"to make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statement not misleading" in
the connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 36 Therefore, an
action can be premised on an executive's misstatement
investor's lOb-5
37
or omission.
In Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court held that silence,
which is considered an omission, is only fraudulent if either the executive
or the company had a duty to disclose that information. 38 Therefore,
investors will need to prove that the executive's failure to disclose a
private fact was material and that the executive had a duty to disclose that
private fact.
A fact is material if there is "a substantial likelihood that the disclosure
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available., 39 It will be even more difficult for an investor to successfully
prove a fact is material when the fact is contingent or speculative in nature
because "it is difficult to ascertain whether the 'reasonable investor'40
would have considered the omitted information significant at the time."
Even if an investor can prove materiality, the investor must still prove
the executive had a duty to disclose that fact, which will be a difficult
task. A corporation, or its executive, has a duty to disclose if a statute or
SEC rule requires the disclosure. 4 1 No current rule or statute requires
33.

Tom C. W. Lin, Undressingthe CEO: DisclosingPrivate, MaterialMatters ofPublic

Company Executives, 11. U. PA. J. Bus. L. 383, 401 n. 113 (2009).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2015) (making it unlawful "to make any untrue statement of
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement not
mislead" in the connection with the purchase or sale of securities).
35. See Chiarella v. United States, 45 U.S. 222 (1980).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
37. Id.
38.

Chiarella,45 U.S. at 235.

39. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (adopting the materiality standard
stated in TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976) for the Rule 1Ob-5 standard).
40. Id.
41.

STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR SMALL & EMERGING COMPANIES § 19:8

(2015) (stating a duty to disclose arises when an independent statute or regulation require such
disclosure).
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these private fact disclosures so this cannot serve as the basis for a duty.
Additionally, the Supreme Court indicated that a duty to disclose may
arise out of an executive's fiduciary relationship with shareholders.42
However, the duty only extends to information that the shareholders are
entitled to know due to that relationship.43 The Supreme Court reasoned
that there is a duty if the disclosure is necessary to prevent an executive
from "taking advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders.,

44

It

would be difficult for a shareholder to prove the executive withheld a
private fact to take advantage of the uninformed shareholders rather than
to uphold his or her privacy right. Even if an investor can prove the
executive made a material omission and had a duty to disclose that private
matter, the investor must still satisfy the four additional 1Ob-5 elements,
which will be no easy task.45
Alternatively, an executive has a duty to correct a prior statement that
has become misleading. 46 If an executive made a statement that was true
at the time but it later became misleading due to a subsequent event, then
the executive must disclose information to render that prior statement no
longer misleading. 47 For example, if in March, a CEO of a public
company stated, "I am healthy," but in June, the CEO learns she has
cancer, then the CEO may be required to disclose that
cancer diagnosis
48
to make the March statement no longer misleading.
This disclosure duty requires the executive to have made a prior
statement. There is no duty if an executive always remains silent. Thus,
if the CEO never made the "I am healthy" statement, then she may never
need to disclose the subsequent cancer diagnosis.
B. Policy Behind DisclosingCorporateInformation
Lacking a clear disclosure duty under the current securities laws,
investors may resort to arguing that the policy and purpose of the
securities laws justify expanding the disclosure duty to include
executives' private facts. A primary purpose of the Securities Act of
193341 (1933 Act) and Securities Exchange Act of 193450 (1934 Act) is

42.

Chiarella,45 U.S. at 228.

43. Id.
44. Id.at 228-29 (quoting Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del.
1951)).
45. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2015); see also COHN, supra note 41, § 19:8 (stating scienter is
generally the most difficult element for a shareholder to successfully prove).
46. United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2010).
47. Id.
48. See id
49. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a (West 1933).
50. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (West 1934).
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to protect investors by implementing a philosophy of disclosure. 51 The
securities laws were enacted for many purposes. The 1933 Act seeks to
"prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of
securities."52 Additionally, the securities laws "promote transparency in
the marketplace. 53 As stated in a House Report to the 1934 Act, "[T]here
cannot be honest markets without honest publicity., 54 The disclosure
obligations uphold those purposes
and enable the investors to make
55
informed investment decisions.
Although the policy behind the securities laws promotes disclosure,
this policy does not stand for an all-encompassing duty to divulge any
and all information. Otherwise, there would be no need for Congress or
the SEC to explicitly mandate certain disclosures.56
Investors may argue that withholding material private facts infringes
the investors' ability to make informed investment decisions. However,
the investors may be seeking the disclosure duty for another motive. A
finance study on market participation concluded that investors desire
more corporate information after learning of a company scandal.57 The
existence of corporate scandals did not end after the infamous Enron or
WorldCom scandals.58 In 2015, the public learned about Volkswagen's
emission test scandal.5 9 Due to the proliferation of corporate scandals,6 °
investors may use executives'
private fact disclosures to fill their need for
61
more information.

51. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988). See also Miller, supra note 8, at
1652 (stating Congress enacted the 1933 Act and 1934 Act to promote transparency in the market).
52.

Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

(last modified Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secact1933.
53. See Miller, supra note 8, at 1665.
54. H.R. REP.No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934).
55. Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 52.
56. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(b); 17 C.F.R. § 229.402.
57. Mariassunta Giannetti & Tracy Yue Wang, CorporateScandals & Household Stock
Market Participation4 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 405, 2014),
available at https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/csom-sites/finance/Giannettil12914.
pdf.

58. See Enron, The Real Scandal, supra note 10; see also David Hancock, World-Class
Scandal at Worldcom, CBS NEWS (June 26, 2002, 9:23 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
world-class-scandal-at-worldcom/.
59.

Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal Explained, BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015),

http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772.
60. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
61. See Abril & Olazabal, supra note 9, at 1551.
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HI. THE DISCLOSURE DEBATE: WHAT PRIVATE
FACTS MUST BE DISCLOSED?

If there is a duty to disclose, it remains unclear exactly what private
facts an executive must disclose to the public. Should the duty be limited
to health concerns? Or should an executive be required to disclose other
private matters, such as personal spending habits? A law review article
suggested that the disclosure duty extend to private facts that reflect on
the executives' integrity or ability to serve their positions in the
corporation. 62 Under this standard, an executive would not need to
disclose a private 63fact that has no bearing on their integrity or ability to
hold the position.
That standard may serve as a sufficient starting point, but it does not
define the necessary connection between the private fact and its impact
on the executive's ability, integrity, or fitness to serve the position. A
serious health ailment, such as a cancer diagnosis64 or heart attack,65
which can limit an executive's ability to serve the corporation, may
evidence a sufficient connection to require disclosure. But the connection
grows weaker as the facts become more private, such as mental health
ailments, prescription medications, or personal addictions.66 Those
private facts start to implicate the privacy concerns discussed in Part 1V.67
The media has started reporting on executives' personal expenditures,
sexual relationships, and marital statuses. 68 For example, the USA Today
reported that former Tyco CEO, Dennis Kozlowski, spent $6000 on a
shower curtain. 69 A magazine described the adulterous affair between
Steve Wynn, CEO of Wynn Resorts, and a woman "25 years his junior"
while discussing Steve Wynn's divorce. 70 These disclosures by the media
may cause investors to believe the disclosure duty should extend beyond
an executive's health.
62. See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 495-96.
63. See id. at 496 ("[I]nformation that has 'no bearing at all' on either ability or
integrity/value of the executive has no disclosure interest.").
64. Maggie McGrath, Goldman ChiefLloyd Blankfein Discloses 'Highly Curable' Cancer,
FORBES (Sept. 22, 2015, 8:47 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2015/09/22/
goldman-chief-lloyd-blankfein-discloses-highly-curable-cancer/.
65. Joann S. Lublin et al., United Continental CEO Oscar Munoz Suffers Heart Attack,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2015, 7:23 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/united-continental-ceo-oscarmunoz-suffers-heart-attack- 144501 5488.
66. See infra Part IV.
67. See infra Part IV.
68. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (discussing Tyco's CEO spending $6000
on a shower curtain and Steve Wynn's affair).
69. Exeter, Report: Tyco CEO Spent $6, 000 for Shower Curtain, USA TODAY (Aug. 7,
2002), http://usatoday30.usatoday.coml/money/industries/manufacturing/2002-08-07-tyco-ceo-m
oneyx.htm.
70. Friess, supra note 4.
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Executives may attempt to avoid disclosing more personal facts by
claiming those facts lack a quantitative economic impact on the
corporation. 7 ' In United States v. Matthews, Clark Matthews, an
executive of Southland Corporation, was running for a position on the
board of directors.72 Prior to running for the position, Matthews was
acquitted of conspiring to bribe a state tax official.73 In the proxy
statement, Matthews did not disclose that he had previously participated
in a grand jury investigation for that bribery charge.74 Under the securities
laws, Item 401(f) requires a person running for a director position to
disclose any criminal convictions or participation in pending criminal
proceedings that are "material to an evaluation of the ability or integrity
of any director."75 The Department of Justice argued that Matthews
violated Item 401 (f) by not disclosing the prior grand jury investigation.76
However, the Second Circuit disagreed and held that Item 401 (f) does
not require Matthews to disclose uncharged criminal conduct, such as a
grand jury investigation. 77 The Second Circuit held that Item 401(f)
requires a disclosure of information that will have a quantitative impact
on the company or its shareholders. 78 Matthews failed to disclose
qualitative information, and the Department of Justice failed to prove that
his non-disclosure had any quantitative economic impact.79
The Matthews holding is distinguishable if an investor proves the
executive's omission had an adverse economic impact on the corporation
or its shareholders. 80 Proving an adverse economic impact, such as a drop
in stock price, 81 will be required under a 1Ob-5 action since a plaintiff
must prove pecuniary harm. 82 If an investor can prove an economic harm
due to the material omission then the Matthews holding is no longer a
valid defense for the executive.
Lacking explicit securities laws or SEC guidance, 83 executives are left
guessing what private facts they should disclose to avoid a potential
securities fraud action. An executive may choose to disclose private facts
that evidence a direct impact on his or her ability, integrity, or fitness to
71. United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
72. Id. at 39-40.
73. Id. at 39. Matthews was acquitted of this charge. Id.
74. Id.
75. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f)(2) (2015).
76. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f); Matthews, 787 F.2d at 49.
77. Id. at 49-50.
78. Id.at 49.
79. Id.
80. See id; see also Miller, supra note 8, at 1665.
81. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 3 (stating United's stock price dropped after the
disclosure); see also Miller, supra note 8, at 1665.
82. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
83. Lin, supra note 33, at 401.
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hold the position. Yet, some executives may desire to not disclose any
84
private facts claiming that their privacy right protects that information.
IV. NON-DISCLOSURE BASED ON EXECUTIVES' PRIVACY RIGHT

A privacy right may protect executives that do not wish to disclose
these private facts. People have a right to control personal, sensitive
information. 85 A privacy right is protected by the U.S. Constitution8 6 and
various federal or state statutes. 8 7 In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court
stated a person has a constitutional privacy interest in "avoiding
disclosure of personal matters." 88 Additionally, an executive may utilize
property-based privacy claims, such as confidential business
information, 89 or tort-based privacy claims, such as public disclosure of
private fact or intrusion upon seclusion. 90 Potential remedies for an
executive include an injunction to prevent future disclosure or damages
91
if a private party has already publically disclosed the information.
An executive's privacy right is not so broad to include all private facts.
Otherwise, executives would not be subject to the currently required
92
disclosures, such as age, prior criminal convictions, or compensation,
which could all be considered private in nature.
There are many barriers to privacy in personal information. The first
barrier is a person loses a right to privacy in information that he or she
communicates to the public. 93 As the Warren & Brandeis article states,
"[t]he right is lost only when the author himself communicates his
production to the public, -- in other words, publishes it."'94 Thus, an
executive cannot personally publicize or disclose the private fact, or
84.

See infra Part IV.

85. MILLS, supra note 16, at 16 (discussing the personal-information sphere).
86. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965) (explaining that the Bill of
Rights has penumbras that create a zone of privacy that is protected from governmental intrusion);
see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (holding an individual has an interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters).
87. MILLS, supra note 16, at 311-38 (discussing federal privacy statutes, such as the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, the
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1998, the Communications Decency Act of 1996, and the Privacy
Protection Act of 1980).

88. See id. at 17 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
89. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25-26 (1987) (holding a company has a
property right in its confidential business information).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, supra note 16.
91. MILLS, supra note 16, at 16.
92. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(b), (f) (2015); 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2015).
93. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193, 199-200 (1890).

94. Id.
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95
consent to its disclosure, and then seek to recover for its disclosure.
As a second barrier, a person has less privacy over information located
in a public record.96 Thus, the magazine that published an article on Steve
Wynn's divorce 97 would likely not be held liable since a divorce is a
public record. 98 For a third barrier, under the tort-based claims, an
challenges claiming
executive will have to overcome First Amendment
99
that the disclosed private fact is newsworthy.

A. The ConstitutionalPrivacyRight
If the government, or a state-actor, forces an executive to disclose
highly private facts, the executive can argue that disclosure infringes his
or her constitutional privacy right. In Griswold v. Connecticut,10 0 the
Supreme Court held that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments cast a penumbras of rights creating a constitutional privacy
right.' 0 ' This privacy right protects an individual's decisional privacy and
informational privacy. 102

Decisional privacy protects an individual's right of autonomy to make
important decisions,' 0 3 but it only protects "the most intimate aspects of
human affairs."' 1 4 As such, decisional privacy is limited to autonomy
05
relating to marriage, family, procreation, and child rearing.'
Executives' private fact disclosures0 6 will likely not involve his or her
autonomy to make those decisions.
The Supreme Court also recognized that the constitutional privacy
right incorporates informational privacy, an "individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters."' 1 7 This right "includes the right
95. See id (arguing the right to privacy is lost "when the author himself communicates his
production to the public"); see also Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Waiver or Loss of Right of
Privacy, 57 A.L.R. 3d 16, § 3 (1974).
96. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) ("[I]nterests in privacy
fade when the information involved already appears on the public record."); see also MILLS, supra

note 16, at 50 56 (describing the privacy issues when information iGobtained in a public record).
97. Friess, supra note 4.
98. See Public Records, STATEOFFLORDA.COM (last visited Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.
stateoffiorida.com/public-records-check.aspx.
99.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
1996)).

DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 3:17 (2015).

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 484-85.
See MILLS, supra note 16, at 119.
See Griswold,381 U.S. at 485; see also MILLS, supra note 16, at 6.
MILLS, supra note 16, at 124 (quoting Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 625 (8th Cir.

105. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; see also MILLS, supra note 16, at 6.
106. J. THoMAs MCCARTHY, 1 RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY § 5:57 n.4 (2d ed. 2015);
see also MILLS, supra note 16, at 16.

107.

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
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to be free from the government disclosing private facts about its citizens
and from the government inquiring into matters in which it does not have
a legitimate and proper concern." 10 8 This
right is afforded less protection
09
scrutiny.'
rational-basis
to
subject
and
Ultimately, an executive may bring a constitutional privacy right
claim against the government or state-actor. 110 A claim based on
informational privacy is unlikely to succeed because it is subject to
rational-basis review." 1 If instead a claim is based on decisional privacy,
then the executive has a better chance of success since the government
112
must then offer a compelling interest to intrude upon this freedom.
Decisional and informational privacy only protect against the
government or state-actor. If a private individual violates an executive's
privacy right, then the 3 executive must rely on tort-based or propertybased private actions."l
B. The Company's ConfidentialBusiness Information
A corporation can argue that disclosing its executive's private facts
violates the corporation's right to exclude others from its confidential
business information. Corporations' stock prices tend to drop after a
negative disclosure about an executive. 114 Thus, the corporation may seek
to recover some of those losses against the publisher that violated the
115
company's property right in confidential business information.
In Carpenterv. UnitedStates, the Supreme Court held the Wall Street
6
Journal (WSJ) had a property interest in the contents of its columns."
The WSJ published a column called "Heard on the Street," which
discussed stock investment opportunities and news. 1 7 A reporter for
"Heard on the Street" disclosed confidential stock information to two
1 18
investors before the information was published in the column.
108. Ramie v. City of Hedwig Vill., 765 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600-02 (1977)).

109. Id. at 492 (considering whether the invasion of privacy outweighs the government's
legitimate
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

interest); see also MILLS, supra note 16, at 17.
See Ramie, 765 F.2d at 492.
See Whalen, 492 U.S. at 599-600.
See MILLS, supra note 16, at 16.
See infra Part IV.B.
Temin, supra note 13; see, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 3 (stating United's stock price

dropped after the disclosure).
115. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) ("Confidential business
information has long been recognized as property."); see also United States v. Grossman, 843
F.2d. 78,
116.
117.
118.

85-86 (2d Cir. 1988).
Carpenter,484 U.S. at 26.
Id. at22.
Id. at23.
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"Confidential business information has long been recognized as
property" when a corporation acquired the confidential information
through the course or conduct of its business."l 9 The WSJ's property right
included the right to use its business information at its discretion and the
right to keep business information confidential. 20
Under this property-based claim, a corporation may seek to exclude
others from disclosing a private fact about its executive or seek damages
if the fact has already been disclosed. 12 1 The protected business
information does not have to create a commercial value for the
corporation.122 However, a corporation may have a difficult time proving
its executive's private fact is the corporation's confidential business
information. A court might consider the private fact as confidential
business information if the executive regularly discloses his or her private
facts to the corporation for business purposes. 123 Additionally, executives
can enter into disclosure contracts with their corporations to further
that the private fact is confidential business
support a finding
124
information.

C. PublicDisclosure of PrivateFacts
If a private individual, such as the media, publishes an executive's
private fact without the executive's consent then the executive may bring
25
a claim against that individual for the public disclosure of private fact. 1
Under this tort claim, the executive has a cause of action "if the matter
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to126a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public."'
Whether the disclosure would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person is an objective determination. 127 For example, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that disclosing a wife's premarital
affair to her husband was highly offensive. 128 Similarly, the magazine
119. Id. at 26; see also MILLS, supra note 16, at 205 (explaining privacy rights under a
property theory).
120. Carpenter,484 U.S. at 26.
121. See id.
122. See MILLS, supra note 16, at 216 n.1162 (stating courts will recognize a property
interest in information without a commercial value through John Locke's labor theory).
123. Carpenter,484 U.S. at 26.
124. See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 490 (proposing that executives contract with their
company to determine a privacy disclosure policy).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, supra note 16.
126. Id.
127. ELDER, supra note 99, § 3:17.
128. McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 113 (1985). The Circuit Court concluded that
disclosure to her husband satisfied the publicity requirement for the public disclosure of private
fact claim due to the special relationship between the husband and wife. Id. at 112.
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article discussing Steve Wynn's affair with a younger woman might
satisfy the highly offensive element. 129 Furthermore, the following
disclosures have similarly been found to satisfy the highly offensive
requirement: disclosing that a person is taking the depression medication

Prozac, 130 disclosing a person's eating disorder,' 3 ' disclosing a person's
psychiatric hospitalization, 132 disclosing an employee's sexual preference
and orientation through a management application process, 133 and
disclosing a person receives substance abuse counseling. 134 Many of the
potential private fact disclosures listed in Part III would seemingly satisfy
the highly offensive requirement.
An executive must also prove that the private fact is not a legitimate

public concern. 135 A private fact that is newsworthy will be a matter of
legitimate public concern. 136 "A newsworthy story that is true will
virtually always fall under the First Amendment's protection of free
speech, even if the story is private and offensive., 137 To avoid liability, a
publisher, the individual disclosing the private fact, will often argue that
the private fact is newsworthy because it either involves a public figure
or the fact is one the public has a right to know.
Not all private fact disclosures are newsworthy.'3 8 But
newsworthiness is not uniformly defined. 13 9 Courts have considered a
variety of factors, including whether the activity occurred in public,
whether the information is already publicly available, whether the
disclosure violates community standards and is intrusive, whether
someone is a public figure, and whether the information is relevant to
129. See Friess, supra note 4.
130. Stratton v. Krywko, No. 248669, 248676, 2005 WL 27522, at *1-5 (Mich. Ct. App.
Jan. 6, 2005).
131. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1207-08 (Mo. 1942).
132. Wilson v. Grant, 297 N.J. Super. 128, 140 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
133. Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2005) (sharing of the test
results would likely be highly offensive to a reasonable person).
134. Warren v. Connecticut Cmty. for Addition Recovery, Inc., No. CV095005416S, 2010
WL 4342283, at *6-7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2010) (holding Plaintiff's amended complaint
sufficiently states a claim for the public disclosure of private fact).
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, supra note 16.
136. See id.
137. See MILLS, supranote 16, at 228 ("A newsworthy story that is true will virtually always
fall under the First Amendment's protection of free speech, even if the story is private and
offensive."); see also Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 717 (Cal. 2007) (holding newsworthiness
precludes a public disclosure of private fact claim because the disclosure is of legitimate public
concern).
138. But see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001) (holding that a news source that
lawfully obtained information regarding a public matter and later disclosed it is protected under
the First Amendment).
139. See MILLS, supra note 16, at 231-40 (describing four different approaches to define
newsworthiness).
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society.

14 0

Courts use one of four different approaches to evaluate whether a
disclosed fact is newsworthy. 14 ' The first approach utilizes the Second
Restatement of Torts standard. 142 This approach considers the morals,
values, and customs of the community to determine a legitimate public
interest.143 If a reasonable person in that community would say that he
has no concern for the private fact then the private fact is not
newsworthy.144
The second approach expands the definition of newsworthy and it is
more deferential to publishers. Under this approach, information that is
true and lawfully obtained will be newsworthy. 145 Regardless of the
objectively offensive nature of a disclosure, a truthful disclosure that is
lawfully obtained may be protected under the publisher's First
Amendment right.
The fourth approach is the minority position, 146 but it is the standard
that this Article offers as the most likely to properly balance an
executive's privacy interest against the public's right to know the private
fact. Under this approach, California courts have adopted a three-part test
to determine whether a private fact is newsworthy. 14 7 In Diaz v. Oakland
Tribune, Inc., a California appellate court stated that to determine
whether a private fact is newsworthy, the trier of fact will consider "[1]
the social value of the facts published, [2] the depth of the [disclosure's]
intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and [3] the extent to which the
party voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety.' 4 8
Furthermore,
that court held the determination is a question of fact for the
9

jury.

14

Diaz was the first woman elected student body president of the
College of Alameda. 150 The Oakland Tribune, a local newspaper,
published a column stating that Diaz is transgender, 15 1 a fact that Diaz

140. Seeid. at231.
141. Id.
142. RESTATEMENT
143.

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652D, supra note 16, cmt. h.

Id.

144. Id.
145. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989) (noting that courts must balance a
person's privacy right against the publisher's right to publish lawfully obtained information).
146. See MILLS, supra note 16, at 236.
147. See id. at 235 (describing the California Approach's three-part test for
newsworthiness).
148. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 132-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(alteration in original).
149. Id.at 133.
150.

Id. at 123.

151.

Id.at 124.
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had sought to remain unknown and private.' 52 Specifically, the
newspaper published, "students at the College of Alameda will be
surprised to learn that their student body president, Toni Diaz, is no lady,
but is in fact a man whose real name is Antonio."' 53 The column further
stated, "I suspect his female classmates in P.E. 97 may wish to make other
showering arrangements."' 154 Diaz sued the Oakland Tribune for public
disclosure of private fact. 155 At trial, the 1jury
56 found the private fact was
not newsworthy under the three-part test.
Under the first element of the Diaz test, the social value of the
disclosed private fact must be viewed in context and it cannot be based
on an alternative, hidden purpose, such as humiliation. 157 Considering the
words published by the OaklandTribune, the disclosure had little public
purpose other than to embarrass Diaz.' 58 Those hostile intentions do not
provide any social value. 15 Therefore, if a publisher only intends to
embarrass the executive or to harm the
executive's reputation then the
60
disclosure should not be newsworthy. 1
Diaz's third element, the extent an individual assumes a position 1of
61
public notoriety, is likely to be the most troubling for executives.
"Persons who... willingly become involved in public affairs waive their
right to privacy of matters connected with their public conduct.' ' 162 This
privacy limitation provides the public with a right to know information
relating to a public figure's role. 163 Therefore, an executive with a
prominent role in a well-known corporation may not be able to claim64a
right to privacy regarding the activities connected with their position. 1
Admittedly, some executives are appropriately regarded more akin to
celebrities in the public eye. 165 For example, Warren Buffett, Martha
Stewart, and Bill Gates would likely be public figures due to their
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.at 123.
Id.at 124.
Id.
Id.at 122.
Id.at 125.
Id.at 135.
See id.at 124.

159.

Id.at 132-33.

160.
161.

See generally id.at 135.
Id. at 132 ("[T]he extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public

notoriety.").
162.

Id.at 134.

163.

Id.

164.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, supra note 16, cmt. e. A person that

voluntarily assumes a prominent role in an institution or activity that has a general economic,
social, or public interest cannot complain when his appearances or activities regarding that role
are publicized. Id.
165.

See Lin, supranote 33, at 423-24 (stating executives of public companies as considered

akin to celebrities and public officials).
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prominent roles in well-known corporations. Therefore, they may
appropriately be afforded a lower expectation of privacy166regarding
private facts that reflect upon their role in their corporations.
But certainly not every executive is a public figure; therefore, Diaz's
third element should not act as a complete barrier. Certain executives may
be able to successfully argue that they are not public figures and have not
assumed a role of public notoriety. 167 A Michigan Appellate Court
recognized that a person is not considered a public figure for all activities
that garner general public interest. 168 That court held:
The fact that [persons] engage in an activity in which the public
can be said to have a general interest does not render every aspect
of their lives subject to public disclosure. Most persons are
connected with some activity... as to which the public can be said
as a matter of law to have a legitimate interest or curiosity. To hold
as a matter of law that private facts as to such persons are also
could indirectly expose
within the area of legitimate public interest
16 9
view.
public
to
life
private
everyone's
Executives should not automatically be public figures. A blanket
finding that executives are public figures will likely deter qualified people
from holding such positions because they will not want the public to be
entitled to know any and all of their private facts. This Article instead
suggests that public figure status and newsworthiness should be viewed
on a sliding scale that considers the particular executive and disclosure
on a case-by-case basis.
Even executives generally known by the public are not without hope.
To evade a finding of newsworthiness, these executives can argue the
disclosed private fact has no, or an attenuated, connection with the
executives' integrity or ability to hold the position. 170 In Taus v. Loftus,
the California Supreme Court held a newsworthy disclosure requires a
"logical nexus exist between the complaining individual and the matter
of ... public interest."' 17 1 To determine the logical nexus, courts assess
the person
the relationship "between the events or activities that brought
17 2 For example,
in
into the public eye and the particular facts disclosed.",
Diaz, the California appellate court acknowledged that Diaz was a public
166.

Id. at 424.

167.
168.
169.
170.

See Diaz, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 132, 134.
See Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. (quoting Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)).
See Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 718 (Cal. 2007); see also Schwartz, supra note 17,

at 495-96.
171.
172.

Taus, 40 Cal. 4th at 718.
Id. (noting that this approach is in line with the Restatement view that a legitimate

public interest does not include a morbid and sensational prying into private lives).
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figure for some purposes since she was the student body president. 173
However, the court ultimately held the Oakland Tribune's disclosure had
little, if any, connection to Diaz's fitness as student body president. 174 If
the private fact disclosure does not have a strong connection to the
executive's fitness for the position then the executive can argue that the
175
disclosure is not protected under the newsworthiness doctrine.
To strengthen the lack of nexus argument, an executive can also claim
the disclosed private fact is so offensive that it shocks the community's
notion of decency. 176 In Baugh v. CBS, Inc., Baugh reported domestic
violence to the police.177 A Crisis Intervention Team followed the police
into Baugh's house and filmed her during the police investigation. 178 The
Crisis Intervention Team told Baugh that the video would only be used
for the District Attorney's Office. 179 Although Baugh said that she did
not want the video to be public, CBS televised the video. 180 During the
trial, CBS moved to dismiss the public disclosure of private facts claim
and argued the video was newsworthy since it was a matter of legitimate
181
public interest, but the federal district court denied CBS' motion.
The district court held "a truthful publication is constitutionally
protected if (1) it is newsworthy and (2) it does not reveal facts so
offensive as to shock the community's notions of decency. "182 The
district court acknowledged that certain disclosed private facts do not
provide information that the public is entitled to know but instead serve
as "a morbid and sensational prying" into the individual's private life. 183
Assuming the private fact was not obtained legally through a public
record,184 an executive can argue that the disclosure cannot be a matter of
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
Id.
See Taus, 40 Cal. 4th at 718; see also Diaz, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 134.
See Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 755 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
Id. at 751.
Id. at750-51.
Id.at 751-52.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 750,753,755.

182. Id.at 755 (emphasis added) (quoting Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529,
541 (Cal. 1971)). In Briscoe, the California Supreme Court also held that a news source may be
liable in tort for disclosing true but not newsworthy facts obtained lawfully from a public record.
Briscoe, 4 Cal. 3d at 543. Later, the California Supreme Court stated that the Bartnicki and the
FloridaStar decisions have undermined the Briscoe holding regarding the private facts obtained

from a public record. Gates v. Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., 34 Cal. 4th 679, 692 (Cal. 2004).
183.

Baugh, 828 F. Supp. at 755.

184. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (holding a State may not
impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained through a
public record); see also Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court of Okla., 430 U.S. 308, 308-09, 31112 (1975) (holding a court may not punish a newspaper for disclosing the name of an eleven-yearold boy charged with murder after learning the boy's name during a court detention hearing).
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legitimate public concern because the disclosure reveals private facts that
have no bearing on his or her fitness for the position and the disclosure is
merely a morbid and sensational prying into the executive's life.' 85
The newsworthiness doctrine and First Amendment barriers do serve
an important purpose, which is to allow the media to keep the public
apprised of newsworthy information so that the public may make
informed decisions.'1 86 However, courts must ensure that those barriers do
not exceed their intended purpose.1 87 A newsworthiness determination
should be made on a case-by-case basis, and this Article suggests that the
three-part Diaz test' 88 properly balances an executive's privacy against
the publisher's First Amendment's guarantee. 189 To potentially defeat a
finding of newsworthiness under the three-part Diaz test, 190 executives
can argue (1) that they are not public figures, 191 (2) the disclosed private
fact has either no nexus or an attenuated nexus with their fitness for the
private fact is a "morbid and sensational
position,' 92 and (3) the disclosed 193
prying" into their personal lives.
D. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
The intrusion upon seclusion tort provides a cause of action against a
person who "intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns

...if the

intrusion

would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."' 94 If a person
unlawfully intrudes into an executive's private affairs to obtain personal
information, then the executive can bring an intrusion upon seclusion
claim against the intruder. This tort seeks to punish the intrusion itself' 95
and protects a person's right to be left alone.196 Unlike a public disclosure
of private facts tort claim, an intrusion upon seclusion tort claim does not
require the individual disclose or publicize the private matter. 197
185.

See Baugh, 828 F. Supp. at 755; Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 718 718 (Cal. 2007);

see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, supranote 16.
186. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 126 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
187.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, supranote 16.

188. Diaz, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 132-33.
189. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1989) (noting that the tension of the
press and the right of privacy must be assessed based on the factual consideration of each case).
190. Diaz, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 132-33.
191. See id at 132, 34; see also Lin, supra note 33, at 423-24.
192. See Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 718 (Cal. 2007); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp.
745, 755 (N.D. Cal. 1993); see also Schwartz, supra note 17, at 495-96.
193. See Baugh, 828 F. Supp. at 755; see also Taus, 40 Cal. 4th at 719.
194.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).

195. Id. cmt. a; see also MILLS, supra note 16, at 177 ("[N]o publication of the private
intrusion is necessary.").
196. ELDER, supra note 99, § 2:1.
197.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, supra note 16.
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An executive would utilize this claim against a person who intruded
into the executive's private affairs to discover a personal fact. A physical
intrusion includes situations such as using deception to enter into a
private room, 198 investigating a person in a frightening manner, 199 or

surreptitiously following a person.2 00 However, this tort is not limited to
unlawful trespasses or physical invasions. 20 1 Non-physical intrusions
include filming an individual in their home from neighboring land,20 2
using a wiretap or monitoring device,20 3 or hacking into another's
personal e-mail.20 4 For example, an executive may bring an intrusion
upon seclusion claim against an individual who intentionally overheard,
with or without mechanical
aids, the executive's private conversation
20 5
within a protected area.
An executive must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
intruded.20 6 An executive must prove he or she had an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in the source of their personal
information, such as an e-mail account.20 7 Generally, a person does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in "matters which occur in a
public place. 20 8 Thus, an individual intentionally overhearing or
overseeing an executive's private affairs is not alone sufficient if done in
a public place. 0 9
Additionally, the intrusion must be "highly offensive to a reasonable
person. ' '21° Courts consider a variety of factors to determine whether the
198.

Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271-73 (Ct. App. 1973); see also

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, supra note 194, cmt. b.

199. Noble, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 272 ("A Georgia court also has held that an investigation done
in a frightening manner may provide a cause of action.").
200. Id. ("The Florida Supreme Court recognized that an investigation done by trailing and
shadowing a claimant could amount to an actionable invasion of privacy.").
201. ELDER, supra note 99, § 2:6 (describing non-physical intrusions).
202. See Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1092, 1094-95 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
203. See, e.g., Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 66 Md. App. 133, 164 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1986)'(concluding that a person commits an intrusion by placing a detection device on the
door of an individual's room).
204. Coal. for an Airline Passengers' Bill of Rights v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d
667, 675 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
205.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, supra note 194, cmt. b; see, e.g., Benitez v.

KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 305 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1033 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (providing examples of
actionable intrusions, such as "eavesdropping by wiretapping, peering into the windows of a
private home, or making persistent and unwanted telephone calls").
206. See 62A AM. JuR. 2DPrivacy § 39 n.3 (2016) ("A legitimate expectation of privacy is
the touchstone of the tort of intrusion [upon seclusion]."); see ELDER, supra note 99, § 2:7.
207. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 39 n.3 (2016) ("A legitimate expectation of privacy is the
touchstone of the tort of intrusion [upon seclusion].").
208. ELDER, supra note 99, § 2:7 (quoting Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087
(E.D. Pa. 1980)).
209.

210.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, supra note 16.
Id.; see also MLLS, supra note 16, at 171 n.890.
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intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.211 Some
factors include the degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct, and
expectation
circumstances of the intrusion, the intruder's motive, and2 the
12
upon.
intruded
were
matters
private
whose
person
of the
Voluntary consent to the intrusion is a complete defense. 2 13 However,
the consent must occur either before or during the intrusion itself.2 14 After

the intrusion occurs, any acquiescence by an executive would not
preclude a valid claim. 215

An advantage of this tort claim is that the First Amendment216 does
not provide the media with an "unrestrained right to gather
information." 217 Since the focus of this tort is on the intrusion,218 the First
Amendment does not always shield members of the media when they
"no greater right to
unlawfully acquire information. 219 The press has
220
intrude to obtain information than each citizen."
However, the First Amendment does protect a person who lawfully
obtained another's personal information from a third party despite the
person knowing that the third party unlawfully acquired it. 22 1 In Bartnicki

v. Vopper, an unidentified party illegally recorded labor union
negotiations.222 Thereafter, a man found the tape recording in his mailbox
and delivered it to Vopper. 223 Vopper then aired the recorded negotiations
on his talk show. 2 24 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the original
interception was unlawful. 225 The Court further acknowledged that
Vopper knew, or at least should have known, that the unidentified party's
original recording was unlawful. 226 Yet, the Court held Vopper lawfully

obtained the information and the First Amendment protected Vopper's
211. Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharm., 86 Cal. App. 4th 365, 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 376-77; see also ELDER, supra note 99, § 2:12 (stating consent to an intrusion
negates the tort).

214.

ELDER, supra note 99, § 2:12 ("[C]onsent must exist at the time of the tort.").

215. Id. ("[L]ater acquiescence does not vitiate defendant's liability.").
216 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
217. 62A AM. JUR. 2DPrivacy § 50 (2016).
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, supra note 194, cmt. a; See also MILLS,
supra note 16, at 177 ("[No publication of the private intrusion is necessary.").
219. MILLS, supra note 16, at 181 ("[T]his tort is not always negated by First Amendment

protections.").
220. ELDER, supra note 99, at § 2:7 (quoting Rafferty v. Hartford Courant Co., 36 Conn.
Supp. 239, 242 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980)).
221. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528-29 (2001).

222. Id. at 518. Jack Yocum found a tape containing the illegally intercepted conversations.
Id. at 519. Then Yocum delivered the tape to Vopper. Id.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 525.
Id.
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disclosure since it involved a public matter. 227 Under Bartnicki, an
executive has a valid intrusion upon seclusion claim only against the
party who unlawfully intrudes.228 An executive would not have a valid
claim against a subsequent party that lawfully obtains the information
regardless of the subsequent party's knowledge of the originally unlawful
intrusion.
Intrusion upon seclusion focuses on the means an individual uses to
obtain private information. 229 It seeks to protect against a person
intruding into another's private affairs. 230 The First Amendment might
still be a barrier to this claim, but it does not provide absolute
immunity
231
to a person engaging in unlawful newsgathering activities.
E. Executives'HealthInformation Privacy
An executive will likely seek to protect all types of private fact
disclosures that have a weak nexus with the executive's fitness for the
position.232 Yet, an executive's health information might arguably have a
sufficient bearing on the executive's fitness for the position since it may
affect the executive's ability to hold the position in the long-term. In
general, there are strong policy reasons behind protecting an individual's
health information and therefore an executive should not automatically
be required to disclose all health concerns to the public.
A major policy reason to protect health information is to ensure that
individuals receive necessary health care and are candid with the health
care professionals. 233 "If consumers need to trade their privacy right in
order to obtain health care, they may be less likely to seek care or may be
less honest with their health care practitioners." 234 An executive may be
less likely to seek medical care if the executive knows that he or she will
be required to disclose that information to the public. There are three
detrimental effects that result when people are deterred from seeking
health care:
First, patients unaware that they have transmissible infections or
unwilling to get treatment for those infections may contribute to
the spread of disease. Second, medical research that could further
227.
228.

229.
230.

Id. at 517-19, 525.
Id. at 525.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 652B, supra note 194.
See id

231.
seclusion
232.
233.

See ELDER, supra note 99, at § 2:18 (describing the application of intrusion upon
claim to the press).
See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 495-96.
See Erin B. Bernstein, Health PrivacyIn Public Spaces, 66 ALA. L. REv. 989, 1011

(2015).
234.

Id.at 1010.
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public health efforts may suffer if health privacy is insufficiently
protected. Third, if patients refuse medical testing for fear of
be less able to track and
disclosure, public health agencies 23will
5
trends.
epidemiological
to
respond
Additionally, federal statutes and state evidentiary laws seek to
prevent the unlawful disclosure of an individual's health information. For
example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HJPAA) seeks to protect as confidential an individual's health
information.2 3 6 Congress enacted HIPAA based on five principles.23 7
First, a person should not need to exchange health privacy to obtain health
care. 238 Second, a person's health information should only be disclosed
for health care purposes. 239 Third, a person should be able to trust that his
or her health information is protected when they seek medical
treatment. 240 Fourth, improper use of health information should be
punished. 24 1 Fifth, health information privacy should be balanced against
the right to support law enforcement and medical research; 242 thus,
providing a caveat for health information disclosure.
In addition to federal laws, such as HIPAA, many states have enacted
physician-patient privileges to protect health information privacy. 243 For
example, the New York physician-patient privilege seeks to promote
three objectives:
(1) to maximize unfettered patient communication with medical
professionals, so that any potential embarrassment arising from
public disclosure will not deter people from seeking medical help
and securing adequate diagnosis and treatment, (2) to encourage
medical professionals to be candid in recording confidential
information in patient medical records, and (3) to protect patients'
against disclosure of sensitive
reasonable privacy expectations
244
personal information.

235. Seeid at 1011-12.
236. Press Briefing, Donna Shalala, Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. (Dec. 20, 2000), 2000
WL 1868717, at *3-4.
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There are many important societal purposes in protecting an
individual's health infornation. This Article does not suggest that
executives should be immune from disclosing certain health information.
Instead executives should be required to disclose such information that is
necessary to provide transparent corporate disclosures to allow the public
to make informed investment decisions. 24 5 This disclosure requirement
should be balanced against the need to ensure that individuals seek and
246
receive health care.

V. CONCLUSION

Under the current securities laws, executives have the discretion to
either disclose a private fact or keep it confidential.247 Greater clarity is
needed to appropriately balance executives' privacy right against the
public's right to know information affecting their investment
decisions.248 This Article suggests that an executive should consider
disclosing a personal fact if it is not highly private and has a direct nexus
249
with the executive's ability or fitness to hold the position.
If an executive decides to not disclose, and a third party later discloses
the private fact without the executive's consent,25 ° then the executive can
seek to recover from that individual based on the executive's privacy
right to control personal information.25 ' An executive utilize a
constitutional privacy right claim 252 or a tort-based or property-based
action.2 53 However, if the private fact disclosure is newsworthy then the
publisher's First Amendment guarantee may defeat the executive's
25 4
privacy claim.
245.
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